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The Duty to Support Nationalistic Policies

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ABSTRACT

We demonstrate that citizens perceive a duty to support policies that benefit their nation, even when they themselves judge that the consequences of the policies will be worse on the whole, taking outsiders into account. In terms of actions, subjects think they would do their perceived duty rather than violate it for the sake of better consequences. The discrepancy between duty and judged consequences does not seem to result from self-interest alone. When asked for reasons, many subjects felt an obligation to help their fellow citizens before others, and they also thought that they owed something to their nation, in return for what it did for them. The obligation to help fellow citizens was the strongest predictor of perceived duty. In an experiment with Israeli and Palestinian students, group membership affected both perceived overall consequences and duty, but the effect of group on perceived consequences did not account for the effect on perceived duty.

KEY WORDS parochialism; nationalism; duty; moral judgment; Israel; Palestine

> By nationalism I mean first of all the habit of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and that whole blocks of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labelled "good" or "bad." But secondly — and this is much more important — I mean the habit of identifying oneself with a single nation or other unit, placing it beyond good and evil and recognising no other duty than that of advancing its interests. George Orwell (1945)

INTRODUCTION

The tendency of people to favor a group that includes them while underweighing or ignoring harm to outsiders has been called parochialism (Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1991). A prime example is nationalism in the sense of favoring policies that benefit one's own nation regardless of their effect on outsiders. This sort of favoritism goes almost unquestioned in many circles, just as analogous forms of racism and sexism went unquestioned in the past. Our interest here is in how people think about parochialism in moral terms, not in its causes. We first review the general concept and its nature.

Demonstrations of parochialism

We use the term "parochialism" because it arose in previous literature in the context of experimental games in which subjects made decisions about allocation of resources (usually money) to members of an in-group or an out-group. As we shall explain, the finding of interest is that people will sacrifice their own resources in order to help their own group, even when they simultaneously hurt an out-group to such an extent that the overall consequences of their choice, including their own loss, are negative. Terms such as "nationalism" and "patriotism" traditionally have a much broader meaning. They refer to beliefs about in-groups and out-groups, and emotions aroused by thoughts about groups, as well as to tendencies to make decisions that affect these groups differently. Our concern here is with allocation, although our questions are all hypothetical because they concern real government policies, which we cannot give our subjects power to control.

The willingness to harm an out-group is not a necessary consequence of wanting to help an in-group (Brewer, 1999; Halevy, Bornstein, & Sagiv, 2008; Halevy, Weisel, & Bornstein, 2011). However, when policies affect both insiders (e.g., co-nationals) and outsiders, and when citizens give greater weight to insiders, the citizens may favor policies that harm outsiders more than they help insiders, leading to worse outcomes overall. Thus, citizens may favor excessive harm to outsiders even when they do not desire the harm itself for its own sake (and would not impose it but for the benefit to insiders), so long as the citizens are not reluctant to harm outsiders as a side effect. We thus define parochialism here as the support for policies that make outcomes better for an in-group but worse overall, or opposition to policies that make outcomes worse for an in-group but better overall, and we examine parochialism by using nationalism as our main example. Of course, in some cases, motives may be truly competitive so that harm to outsiders is desired (e.g., Rousseau, 2002). But here we define nationalism as a form of parochialism, so we assume only a willingness to tolerate greater harm to outsiders rather than a desire to bring about that harm.[1]

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[1]Others define nationalism explicitly as an antipathy to outsiders (e.g., Druckman, 1994; Skitka, 2005).

Several laboratory experiments show that subjects will contribute money to help their own group, even when their contribution harms an out-group so much that the loss to the out-group equals the benefit to the in-group; the subject loses the contribution and does no net good for others (Bornstein & Ben-Yossef, 1994; Schwartz-Shea & Simmons, 1990, 1991). Willingness to contribute is greater than when the second group is removed, which makes the net benefit of contributing positive. In another type of study, Fehr, Bernhard, and Rockenbach (2008) found that children as young as 7 tend to sacrifice self-interest in order to promote within-group equality but not to create equality between themselves and outsiders.

In defining parochialism as neglect of the interests of outsiders, we do not assume that group loyalty implies such neglect or that group loyalty itself has no benefits. People have many good reasons to cooperate with in-group members that do not apply to out-group members. Group loyalty provides emotional benefits and promotes within-group cooperation (Bowles & Gintis, 2004), but these benefits do not need to come at the expense of others to such an extent that the harms exceed them (Tan, 2004). And it is not necessarily parochial when we refuse to do something to improve things for out-group members. Many groups (including nations) operate within a scheme of local responsibility, in which, for efficiency reasons, they are given local control. In such cases, interference with a group by outsiders, even for what appears to be the greater good, would have the negative effect of undermining local control and setting a precedent for outsiders coming in and making things worse (Baron, 1996).

Parochialism may be in part an inevitable side effect of group loyalty that exists for good reasons, combined with thoughtlessness about outsiders. But some of it may result from fallacious thinking, or particular ways of framing the situation, some of which may be corrected by presenting choices differently (Baron, 2001, in press; Baron, Altman, & Kroll, 2005). For example, people see self-sacrifice for their group as really not sacrifice at all, an "illusion of morality as self-interest." This illusion and its effects are reduced when people are forced to calculate the costs and benefits of the options before them. Parochialism is also reduced when harm is seen as being caused by action rather than omission, and when people think in terms of individuals rather than the abstraction of groups (such as nations).

We advance no position here about the origin of parochialism. We suspect that it is overdetermined by many causes. For example, it could arise from greater empathy toward those who are similar to us (Tarrant, Dazeley, & Cottom, 2009), indirect satisfaction of motives such as that for self-esteem arising from group identity (Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002), biological evolution (Choi & Bowles, 2007), and various cognitive illusions such as the voter's illusion (the confusion of correlation and causality concerning the relation between own behavior and others' behavior; Quattrone & Tversky, 1984) and the illusion that cooperation with a group advances self-interest (Baron, 2001). In addition, cooperation within a single group has been explained in terms of cultural evolution of social norms (Ostrom, 2000). An obvious extension of the last possibility is that social norms for in-group bias also evolve through cultural transmission. It is more likely that social groups will maintain their cohesiveness if their members uphold such a norm. Groups that fail in this regard are less likely to hang together and survive over time. (See Baron, 2008, p. 214, for a similar suggestion.)

An interesting point about all these explanation, with the exception of social norms, is that they are causal explanations of behavior only. They explain in-group bias, but they do not directly imply that people believe that in-group bias is morally right. To explain this, they would require an additional assumption that people find moral justifications of whatever natural forces lead them to do. Although we cannot rule out the possibility that moral judgments are post-hoc justifications in this way, we can ask whether people think that in-group bias is morally justified, whatever its causes. It is possible that they do not think so. They may instead agree with Katherine Hepburn's character in *The African Queen*, who said, "Nature, Mr. Allnut, is what we are put in this world to rise above" (quoted by Bloom, 2004, p. 129). Thus, our primary question, not addressed previously, is simply whether people think that parochialism is morally justified.

Parochialism as a moral judgment

Of primary interest here is the role of perceived *duty* in parochial choices. We usually think of moral duties as obligations that override self-interest for the benefit of others. Yet, people perceive a duty to make parochial choices. They thus perceive a duty to make choices that end up doing harm to others on the whole. Our main point is thus that parochial choices are non-consequentialist, in the sense of Baron (1994). People follow moral principles that, if taken at face value, make things worse. To make sure that subjects know what they are doing, we asked them both about duty and about overall consequences, and we demonstrated divergence of these two judgments.

Baron (in press) presented subjects with hypothetical proposals involving financial gains or losses to two abstractly defined groups, one defined as the subject's group. The subjects indicated how they would vote, which proposal led to the best consequences overall, and what their duty was. The general result was that many subjects said their duty was to vote for the proposal that was best for their group, even when they agreed that a different proposal was best on the whole, considering both affected groups. This happened even when the group proposal went against the subject's self-interest.

The experiments reported here extend these demonstrations to real proposals, in subjects who were members of real national groups. We asked the subjects for their own judgments of overall consequences, instead of describing the consequences in financial terms. We thus allowed the subjects to weigh the interests of their group more heavily than the interests of outsiders in their judgments of overall consequences. We are interested in a discrepancy between judgments of duty and judgments of what is best on the whole such that subjects see a duty to support a proposal that helps

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their group, beyond what is implied by their own judgments of which proposal is better overall. People may perceive a duty that goes against even what they feel they should do, as when a judge who opposes the death penalty must sentence a criminal to death.

The finding of a discrepancy between what people think they should do and what people think yields the best outcome is a way of demonstrating that people make non-utilitarian moral judgments (e.g., Baron & Jurney, 1993). Such a demonstration avoids problems that might arise with other research methods. In particular, subjects may choose an option that seems optimal to them but seems non-optimal to the experimenter (as found, e.g., by Ubel, DeKay, Baron, & Asch, 1996). In the present studies, people may think that the welfare of their nation is much more important to the world than that of other nations, and such a belief could lead them to think that helping their own nation at the short-term expense of others could lead to better consequences for the world as a whole, or they could think that their own nation should receive more weight, but such a view would affect their judgment of overall consequences (as it does, to some extent).

We also asked about subjects' intentions if they had a chance to influence policy. People may think that their duty is to do one thing but that they will do something else.[2] It is possible that they perceive a discrepancy between duty and optimal outcomes but intend not to do their duty and favor the best outcomes, or they may intend to do their duty whatever the consequences.

Again, we emphasize that our concern here is not with the broader concepts of nationalism or patriotism or their psychological explanations. (Druckman, 2006, provides a recent review of this literature.) We use national policies as a tool for looking at the non-consequentialist nature of duties, and about whether people think they would do what their duty demands. By asking for subjects' judgments of overall consequences, we asked whether they themselves see their duty as inconsistent with the best interests of all people. In particular, we hypothesized that they see their duty as supporting their nation even when they think that the overall consequences of doing so are negative. We also asked whether they favor doing their duty or maximizing consequences. We initially hypothesized that people would go against their duty and favor maximizing consequences, at least some of the time. We were surprised to find that this did not happen.

EXPERIMENT 1

Experiments 1 and 2 were done as questionnaires on the World Wide Web. Subjects were different groups from a panel who did similar experiments for pay, recruited over a decade, mostly through their own searches for opportunities to make money. The members of the panel were mostly US residents and were (as determined from other studies) typical of the US adult population in age, income, and education but not in gender: most were women. Each study had an introductory page followed by several other pages, each with some policy and a few questions.

Experiments 1 and 2 asked about consequences of each policy for the USA, consequences for others, consequences on the whole, duty, the subjects' intention about favoring the policy or opposing it, and the effect of the policy on the subject. Experiment 2 asked about reasons.

Method

The 81 subjects who did the study ranged in age from 23 to 74 years (median 44); 26% were men. They were asked, "Is your primary political loyalty to the U.S. or some other country?"; 86% said U.S., 12% said other; and 1% said "unclear." Our analysis is based on the 70 subjects who said their primary loyalty was to the USA. (The responses of others differed considerably.)

The introduction to the study, called "Government policies," reads as follows:

> Each case concerns your attitude toward U.S. government policies. We ask about your *active support* for various policies. This means that you would be willing to do something. If you support a policy actively, you are more likely to vote for a political candidate who favored that policy. You might also write letters, try to convince others, sign petitions, participate in demonstrations or boycotts, and so on.
>
> We ask about the policies themselves and the duty of U.S. citizens to support or oppose these policies actively. If you are not a U.S. citizen, you can still answer both questions. Give your true attitude of the policy, not the attitude you think you would have if you were a U.S. citizen.

The 20 proposals, listed in Appendix A, were presented in a random order determined for each subject. An example is "Repeal the free-trade agreement with Mexico (part of NAFTA)." Below the proposal on each page, the questions were as follows, with the names we use in reporting the data. (The proposal description was repeated in the middle of the page so that the subjects did not have to scroll in order to have it in view.)

Note that the first seven proposals are parochial in favor of the USA (according to the first author's guess at what most subjects would think, based on previous experience with these subjects) and that the last 13 are the opposite. The 20 proposals were presented in a random order determined for each subject.

US-cons: How would this proposal affect the U.S. on the whole, taking into account both its good effects and bad effects?
The good effects would strongly outweigh the bad ones.
The good effects would weakly outweigh the bad ones.

[2]Falstaff said as much, about the closely related concept of honor, in Shakespeare's *Henry IV*, *Part I*, Act 5, Scene 1: "Well, 'tis no matter; honour pricks me on. Yea, but how if honour prick me off when I come on? How then? Can honour set-to a leg? No. Or an arm? No. Or take away the grief of a wound? No. Honour hath no skill in surgery, then? No. What is honour? A word. What is in that word 'honour'? What is that 'honour'? Air."

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It isn't clear which would be greater. They could be equal.
The bad effects would weakly outweigh the good ones.
The bad effects would strongly outweigh the good ones.

Others-cons: How would this proposal affect other countries on the whole, taking into account both its good effects and bad effects?
[same answers]

Overall-cons: Taking into account the effects on both the U.S. and other countries, what would be the overall effect of this policy?
[same answers]

Duty: What is the duty of U.S. citizens concerning active support of this proposal, or active opposition to it?

support oppose no clear duty either way

Favor: What is your own inclination concerning active support or opposition?

support oppose no clear inclination

Affect-you: How would this proposal affect you personally and those you most care about?

would help would hurt no clear effect

The three consequence questions concern consequences for the USA, others, and overall, respectively. The Duty question is the major dependent variable of interest; we hypothesize that people will have a perceived duty to support what is good for the USA. The Favor question indicates what subjects think they would actually do. Of interest is whether they think they would do their duty to support the USA or, alternatively, support what they think is best on the whole. The Affect-you item is a measure of perceived self-interest, a possible confounding variable.

Results

For analysis of the data, we counted the middle of each scale, the neutral response, as 0. Thus, responses ranged from −2 to 2 for the three consequence questions and from −1 to 1 for Duty, Favor, and Affect-you. In data analysis, the last 13 proposals, which were designed to be bad for the USA, were reverse scored (as if "bad effects" and "good effects" were switched). After this transformation, in 7% of the responses, US-cons was still less than Others-cons, indicating that the subject disagreed with the intended design of the items, so we reversed these responses too so that all responses were on a scale where positive numbers favored the USA, insofar as we could determine.

The three measures of consequences were highly correlated. Across all the data (1400 observations), correlations were .91 for Overall-cons and US-cons, .84 for Overall-cons and Others-cons, and .82 for Others-cons and US-cons. Note that Overall-cons was more closely related to US-cons than to Others-cons. This suggests that subjects were weighing the USA higher in their judgment of overall consequences. We shall return to this issue.

Overall, subjects tend to feel that they have a Duty to support options that are better for the USA (41% support, 19% oppose) and that they favor options that are better for the USA (51% vs. 25%). Table 1 shows the distributions of responses to Duty and Favor. Note that the relation between Favor and Duty is very close except that 38% of the responses perceived no duty one way or the other, compared with 29% that did not favor one option or the other.

Table 2 shows the mean responses to Duty and Favor as a function of Overall-cons and the difference Us-cons–Others-cons, which represents the extent to which the subject thought the response in question favored the USA. It is apparent that both factors play a role. Subjects favor the USA but are not oblivious to overall consequences.

Of primary interest is whether Duty favors the USA even when Overall-cons is controlled. The row corresponding to no difference for Overall-cons in Table 2 suggests that it does. To examine this issue statistically, we used a mixed-model analysis (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008). This allows us to treat proposals and subjects as random effects and to deal appropriately with missing data. We regressed Duty on Overall-cons, with subjects and proposals as crossed random effects, thus accounting for variation in both factors. Of interest is the intercept, where Overall-cons is 0, because

Table 1. Proportions of responses for Favor and Duty in Experiment 1

		Favor			
		−1	0	1	Sum
	−1	.26	.00	.01	.27
Duty	0	.05	.28	.05	.38
	1	.00	.01	.34	.35
Sum		.32	.29	.39	1.00

Note: Positive numbers favor the option that the subject judges to be better for the USA.

Table 2. Mean responses to Duty and Favor as a function of Overall-cons (rows) and of the difference Us-cons–Others-cons (columns)

		Us-cons–Others-cons		
	Overall-cons	0	1	2 or more
Duty	−2	−.87	−.46	−.40
	−1	−.55	−.34	−.13
	0	.04	.11	.35
	1	.65	.40	.54
	2	.95	.73	.93
Favor	−2	−.94	−.83	−.20
	−1	−.63	−.42	−.09
	0	.07	.20	.39
	1	.69	.48	.74
	2	.96	.91	.96

Note: There were very few cases where the difference was greater than 2, so we collapsed these.

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we have coded the responses so that positive numbers favor the USA. As hypothesized, the intercept (.06) was positive ($t = 2.29$, $p = .027$).[3] Thus, Duty favors the USA, as well as being influenced by consequences. Such an effect will lead to cases in which Duty favors the USA even when the overall consequences are judged to be worse. Although such cases existed in our data, there were too few to analyze statistically.

Subjects differed considerably, yet essentially none appeared to show a reversed effect. As an informal demonstration of this, we found that 14 of the 70 subjects showed a significant ($p < .05$ by t-test) difference between Duty and Overall-cons (reduced to a three-point scale so as to be roughly comparable), in the expected direction, significantly more than the 3.5 expected by chance. Yet, 34 of the 70 subjects showed no difference, or a reversed difference (only 1 "significantly" reversed, less than the chance expectation).

It is possible that self-interest could be driving both the sense of duty (Duty) and the willingness to act (Favor) but not the perception of overall consequences. This possibility is not consistent with our data: The difference (mean .08) between Duty and Overall-cons (reduced to -1 to 1 so that the ranges were the same) is found at all values of Affect-you, our measure of self-interest. A mixed-model analysis, in which the Duty–Overall-cons difference was predicted from Affect-you, confirmed that the intercept at 0 is significant ($t = 3.13$, $p = .0028$), even though the effect of Affect-you on the Duty–Overall-cons difference is also significant ($t = 2.53$, $p = .0134$) when both subjects and proposals are included in the analysis as random effects. The test of the intercept did not involve extrapolation, as many proposals and many subjects had means on both sides of 0. In sum, this result provides additional support for a perceived duty to support one's nation, beyond any duty to support what is best overall.

The finding that self-interest (Affect-you) affects the discrepancy between Duty and Overall-cons suggests that people might feel a duty to defend their self-interest. We shall return to this issue.

A second major question is whether Favor, the perceived inclination to act to support one side or the other, is tied to Duty or whether it is more sensitive than Duty to Overall-cons. It seemed likely to us that people would neglect their duty when overall consequences of following duty were worse so that the answers to Favor would be more affected by Overall-cons than would the answers to Duty. In fact, the determinants of Duty and Favor were much the same. In mixed-model regressions of Duty and of Favor on Overall-cons, Affect-you, and the difference US-cons–Overall-cons, the coefficients were, respectively, .30, .44, and .18 for Duty, as a dependent variable, and .33, .46, and .20 for Favor. If anything, Favor was more closely related to Overall-cons, but any such difference is probably the result of the smaller variance of Duty because of the frequent endorsement of "no duty either way" (Table 1). To test whether Duty or Favor was more affected by Overall-cons, we regressed the difference of the standardized scores of Duty and Favor on Overall-cons and Affect-you. Neither predictor was close to significant. In sum, Favor seems to follow Duty, and people do not expect to reject their perceived duty for the sake of the greater good.

[3]Because degrees of freedom are difficult to assess in the method we used (implemented in the lme4 package for R; Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2011), p-values are determined by a Markov Chain Monte Carlo sampling procedure, as described by Baayen et al. (2008), and implemented in the languageR package for R (Baayen, 2009). Note that we cannot simply remove the effect of Overall-cons by including it as a covariate; it is imperfectly measured, and its effect would not be fully removed.

EXPERIMENT 2

In Experiment 2, we replaced some items and changed the wording of others, but the main reason for this experiment was to ask about the reasons for or against Duty responses. We asked about five different reasons, two that we thought would justify a duty to help the USA, two that we thought would justify a duty to do the most good for all, and, in addition, a reason concerning the duty to advance self-interest.

Method

Eighty-three subjects did the study, but our analysis is based on the 80 whose primary loyalty was to the USA. These subjects ranged in age from 22 to 64 years (median 43); 29% were men.

The introduction was similar to Experiment 1, but we added the following: "Some policies will cause the government to spend more money, or less. When the government spends more, it will have to collect more taxes or cut other programs. When it spends less on one program, it can use the money saved on other programs or tax cuts." The procedure was the same as that of Experiment 1. The proposals are listed in Appendix B. The questions were as follows:

US-cons: How would this proposal affect the U.S. on the whole, taking into account both its good effects and bad effects?
The good effects would outweigh the bad ones.
It isn't clear which would be greater. They could be equal.
The bad effects would outweigh the good ones.

Others-cons: How would this proposal affect other countries on the whole, taking into account both its good effects and bad effects?
[same answers]

Overall-cons: Taking into account the effects on both the U.S. and other countries, what would be the overall effect of this policy?
[same answers]

Duty: What is the duty of U.S. citizens concerning active support of this proposal, or active opposition to it?
[same answers as in Experiment 1]

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Reasons: Which of the following is true about duty in this case?

Return: Citizens have a duty to help their nation in return for what their nation does for them.
Fellow: Citizens have a duty to help their fellow citizens before helping others.

Need: People have a duty to help those in need, wherever they are.

Other: People have a duty to help citizens of other nations when their own governments cannot or will not provide the needed help.

Self: A citizen has a duty to support policies that are best for him or her personally.

Favor: Would you be inclined to support this policy or oppose it?
[same answers as in Experiment 1]

Affect-you: How would this proposal affect you personally and those you most care about?
[same answers as in Experiment 1]

Note that the consequence questions now have three-point scales, which makes them more comparable to the other questions.

The first two reasons, Return and Fellow, would be expected to predict duty toward the USA. The next two, Need and Other, would be predicted to work the other way. The Self item was included as a preliminary test of the idea, suggested by the results of Experiment 1 (replicated here) that people feel a duty to advance self-interest.

Results

Tables 3 and 4 are analogous to Tables 1 and 2. The results are broadly the same as in Experiment 1, although Favor seems to be somewhat more affected by Us-cons–Others-cons.

The main statistical results of Experiment 1 were replicated. Again, when we model Duty–Overall-cons as a function of Affect-you, the intercept (.07) is significantly positive ($p = .0022$), and there are subjects and proposals on both sides of 0. Again, we found a significant effect of Affect-you on the Duty–Overall-cons difference (coefficient .02, $p = .0001$). And, again, the determinants of Duty and Favor were much the same: In mixed-model regressions of Duty and of Favor on Overall-cons, Affect-you, and the difference US-cons–Overall-cons, the coefficients were, respectively, .67, .29, and .40 for Duty, as the dependent variable, and .63, .44, and .37 for Favor. Importantly, Other-consequences played no more role in Favor than in Duty. Interestingly, Affect-you seems to play a greater role in Duty than in Favor. When we regressed the difference of the standardized scores of Duty and Favor on Overall-cons and Affect-you, we found (in contrast to Experiment 1) that the coefficient for Overall-cons was significantly positive (.09, $p = .0002$), and the coefficient for Affect-you was negative (−.16, $p = .001$). This is the reverse of the result we originally expected, namely that Favor would be more affected by Overall-cons. And, again, we see that Duty is affected by self-interest. It is very clear that our original expectation that people would go against their perceived duty for the sake of better consequences was incorrect.

As in Experiment 1, subjects differed considerably. Thirteen of the 80 subjects showed a significant ($p < .05$ by t-test) difference between Duty and Overall-cons, in the expected direction, significantly more than the four expected by chance, and 19 of the 80 subjects showed no difference, or a reversed difference (only three "significant").

Table 5 shows the proportion of endorsement for the five reasons for a duty in the direction of helping the USA. The most frequently endorsed reason was Fellow: "Citizens have a duty to help their fellow citizens before helping others." The coefficients in Table 5 come from mixed models with random effects for subjects and proposals. The individual coefficients were based on models in which each reason was the only predictor. The multiple regression coefficients are from a model using all reasons. Of the two reasons expected to predict a duty toward the USA, only Fellow was significant, and then only in one analysis. (But it was also frequently endorsed, so there was little variation.) The Return reason, although endorsed often, was a negative predictor; this could make sense if a subject thought that

Table 3. Proportions of responses for Favor and Duty in Experiment 2

		Favor			
		−1	0	1	Sum
Duty	−1	.32	.01	.01	.35
	0	.04	.29	.05	.38
	1	.01	.01	.25	.27
Sum		.37	.32	.31	1.00

Note: Positive numbers favor the option that the subject judges to be better for the USA.

Table 4. Mean responses to Duty and Favor as a function of Overall-cons (rows) and of the difference Us-cons–Others-cons (columns)

		Us-cons–Others-cons		
	Overall-cons	0	1	2 or more
Duty	−1	−.75	−.85	−.38
	0	.13	.03	.35
	1	.65	.81	.76
Favor	−1	−.89	−.43	−.25
	0	.05	.25	.77
	1	.86	.76	.90

Table 5. Proportions of endorsement of reasons, and their coefficients for prediction of Duty

	Proportion endorsement	Individual coefficients	Multiple regression coefficients
Return	.82	−.22	−.18
Fellow	.89	(.12)	.22
Need	.58	−.33	−.17
Other	.47	−.33	−.20
Self	.44	(.06)	(.05)

Note: Those in parentheses were not significant. All others were $p < .01$.

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the reason did *not* apply to the proposal in question and was thus citing the reason for denying a duty to support a proposal favoring the USA. Both Need and Other worked as predicted, against a duty toward the USA in particular. Self was also a positive predictor, although not significant anywhere. In sum, although subjects endorse other reasons as being true, only the priority of fellow citizens over outsiders seems to justify favoring the USA, whereas a perceived duty to help those in need, wherever they are, and a duty to help those in other nations, seem to justify not helping the USA in particular.

EXPERIMENT 3

Experiment 3 extended the experiment to university students in Israel, both Jews and Palestinian Arabs. The proposals were chosen from current political discussions (summer of 2008). They were more complex than those used in Experiments 1 and 2, typically combining two or three simpler proposals because we wanted to make them realistic. The questionnaire was given on paper in either Hebrew or Arabic. Some of those who completed the Hebrew version indicated that Arabic was their preferred language.

Method

The subjects were classified by their preferred language: 57 Hebrew (29 women, 28 men), 54 Arabic (28 women, 22 men, 4 unknown), and 11 "other" (who answered the Hebrew version). Ages ranged from 18 to 51 years (median 23). Some subjects omitted some items.

The questionnaire was given on paper in July 2008. The introduction reads as follows (in Hebrew or Arabic): "During negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, proposals regarding different issues are put forward. In this questionnaire we will present some of the proposals that have been put forward. We are interested in your reactions to each proposal separately. For each proposal please assume that the issues described in the proposal are the only ones included in this agreement, and there is not interdependence between this proposal and other issues." The proposals were as follows:

1. All parts of Jerusalem will remain under Israeli control, and the Arab neighborhoods will have some municipal autonomy.
2. Jerusalem will be the capital of two states: The Jewish neighborhoods will be part of Israel; the Arab neighborhoods will be part of Palestine. The old city will be governed by an international organization, and will remain open to all.
3. Israel will dismantle all settlements except for the big clusters (Maale Edomim, Ariel, Gush Etzion, and Beitar-Ilit), establishing a new borderline. A free and safe passage for Palestinians will be established between the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinian state will recognize the new border.
4. Palestinians' right of return will be implemented in the Palestinian state, after it is established. Additionally, up to 100 000 Palestinians will be allowed to return to Israel, as part of family reuniting. Israel will withdraw to the 67 border except for a few changes resulting from agreed swaps.
5. Israel will withdraw to the 67 border except for a few changes resulting from agreed swaps. Palestinians will give up the right of return to the area inside Israel.

After each proposal, subjects answered the following questions on similar scales as used in Study 1. The final question was multiple choice and had to be filled out once for Palestinians and once for Israelis:

Icons How will this agreement affect Israel, when you take into account both the positive and the negative consequences?

Pcons How will this agreement affect the Palestinians, when you take into account both the positive and the negative consequences?

Overall-cons What will the overall effect of this agreement be, when you take into account its effect on both Israel and the Palestinians?

Iduty What in your opinion is the duty of an Israeli, concerning active support for or active opposition to this agreement?

Pduty What in your opinion is the duty of a Palestinian, concerning active support for or active opposition to this agreement?

Favor Will you personally support or oppose the agreement?

Affect-you Will you personally or the people closest to you be affected by the agreement?

Ibest/Pbest If the ratification and implementation of the agreement depended only on the vote of Israelis/Palestinians, what would lead to the best consequences overall?

1. Every Israeli/Palestinian will vote according to his self-interest.
2. Every Israeli/Palestinian will vote according to his evaluation of the consequences of the agreement for Israeli/Palestine, taking into account both positive and negative consequences.
3. Every Israeli/Palestinian will vote according to his evaluation of the consequences of the agreement overall, taking into account the consequences for both Israel and the Palestinians.

Results

Duty versus overall consequences

The main question is whether subjects on each side felt they had a duty to support proposals that favor their side even

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when their own judgment of overall consequences did not justify such support. To assess the discrepancy between duty and judged consequences, we correlated two measures. One measure, ConsDiff, was the difference between Mycons, the consequences for the subject's own side, and the Overall-cons (the subject's judgment of overall consequences: each coded as 1, 0–1). Each of these judgments was reduced to three possible responses: favoring the subject's side, neutral/unsure, and favoring the other side. The second measure was Myduty, the subject's duty toward the proposal, defined as Iduty for the Hebrew group and Pduty for the Arab group (and coded as 1, 0, −1). We regressed Myduty on ConsDiff, with random effects for subjects and items, and random slopes for the effect of ConsDiff. The coefficient of .29 was significant ($p = .0024$). Thus, subjects feel a stronger duty to their own side, regardless of their judgment of overall consequences. Here, and elsewhere for the results we report, Hebrew and Arabic subjects did not differ significantly in these effects.

In this experiment, there were 28 complete reversals, (barely) enough to analyze (unlike Experiments 1 and 2). That is, the subject had a duty on one side of neutrality (support/oppose) but judged that the overall consequences were on the other side (worse/better). These reversals were strongly associated with ConsDiff.[4] In nine of 13 of these cases in which the subject expressed a duty to oppose the proposal, ConsDiff was negative (Mycons less than Overall-cons), and Cdiff was 0 in the other four. Likewise, in 11 of 15 cases in which Myduty was positive, Cdiff was positive, and 0 in the other four. The mean product of Myduty and Cdiff was positive for 18 subjects and negative for none, and it was positive for all five proposals.[5] These responses indicate clearly what we could only infer before: When perceived duty takes into account the benefits to one's side, as well as overall consequences, then there will be cases in which one feels a duty to support a proposal that one judges to be worse on the whole, or vice versa.

We created a measure of equal-weight consequences, which was the mean of Icons and Pcons. This would be a utilitarian measure if the two sides had equal populations, which, approximately, they do. This equal-weight consequences measure allowed us to construct an index of partiality to one's own side:

$$\frac{\text{Overall-cons} - (\text{Icons} + \text{Pcons})/2}{(\text{Icons} - \text{Pcons})/2)}.$$

The idea here is that (Icons + Pcons)/2 is the equal-consequences measure. This is subtracted from the judgment of overall consequences. The denominator represents the possible range of the numerator. When the partiality measure was greater than 1, we reduced it to 1, and raised measures below −1. We removed proposals in which the denominator was 0 or less. Thus, the measure was in effect simply an index of which side Overall-cons is closer to, when the proposals were construed in the usual direction. This partiality measure was sensitive to the group: the mean was .50 for Hebrew and −.03 for Arabic ($t_{105} = 4.67$, $p = .0000$ for the difference). Thus, subjects weighed their own group more in judging overall consequences, although both sides seemed to weigh Israel more than Palestine.

Recall that the regression coefficient of Myduty on ConsDiff had a coefficient of .29, and ConsDiff was defined as MyCons–Overall-cons. When we replaced Overall-cons in this analysis with the equal-weight measure of consequences, the coefficient was (not surprisingly) larger, .43 ($p = .0152$) instead of .29.

Another way to test this distinction between duty and consequences is to examine the two questions about duty: for Israelis and for Palestinians. Everyone answered these questions for the other side as well as for their own side, and most subjects thought that the answers were different. The mean difference was 1.6 (possible maximum of 6; $t_{121} = 10.57$, $p = .0000$). In other words, the two sides sometimes have conflicting duties. This could not be true if everyone's duty were to support whatever would produce the best consequences for all.[6]

Effect of consequences for the other side

In the extreme case, people might regard these proposals as a zero-sum game so that a loss for the other side is as good as a gain for one's own side. To test this, we regressed Myduty (duty toward the subject's side) on Mycons and Othercons (consequences for the two sides, respectively) by using a mixed model with subject and proposal as random effects. The coefficient for Mycons was highly significant of course (.41, $t = 30$), but the coefficient for Othercons was slightly positive (.01) and not significant. We found essentially the same result when Favor was the dependent variable. This result indicates that subjects generally do not think of the situation as zero-sum. If they had done so, one coefficient would have been the negative of the other.[7]

We found similar results for the first two experiments, except that the small positive coefficients for consequences for others were significant (all $p < .02$). The Experiment 1 coefficients for Duty 1 were .38 for consequences for the USA and .07 for consequences for others; for Favor, they were .43 and .05, respectively. The Experiment 2 coefficients for Duty were .69 (USA) and .14 (other), and for Favor, .73 (USA) and .15 (other). Again, if anything, subjects seemed to regard good consequences for the other group as good, although not very important.

[4]Twenty-one subjects made only a single reversal, but reversals occurred for all five proposals, with a minimum of three.

[5]A mixed-model analysis with random effects for subjects and proposals showed a significant association at $p = .0001$, but the residual error was far from being normally distributed.

[6]This difference was correlated with the number of proposals in which subjects endorsed voting on the basis of national interest as producing the best consequences ($r = .34$, $p = .0001$); we assume that this is rationalization.

[7]We found essentially the same results when we looked at raw within-subject correlations across the five proposals. The mean correlation between Myduty and Mycons was .90, and that between Myduty and Othercons was .02. Importantly, the distribution of the latter correlation suggested that no subject weighed consequences to the other side negatively: Five of the 89 usable subjects had significant negative correlations between Myduty and Othercons, which is approximately what we would expect by chance.

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Prediction of other side's duty

Because we asked each side about consequences and duty for both sides, we could determine how each side viewed the other side's duty. Do people understand that others think as they do about the relation between consequences for their side and duty? To test this, we regressed, for each subject, Myduty on Mycons and Otherduty on Othercons.[8] The mean coefficients for the Hebrew group were .44 and .31, respectively ($t_{51} = 2.00$, $p = .0511$, for the difference). The corresponding coefficients for the Arabic group were .32 and .19 ($t_{52} = 2.26$, $p = .0280$). The groups did not differ significantly in this difference, and the overall difference was significant ($t_{104} = 3.02$, $p = .0032$). The fact that these coefficients differ suggests that people think that their own side's duty to support policies that are good for their side is greater than the other side's duty to do likewise. Negotiations between two sides might go more smoothly if attempts were made to correct this misjudgment.

Replication

In March, 2010, we replicated this study with 56 Israelis and with a list of 10 proposals instead of the original five. We replicated the major findings of Experiment 3. The effect of Cdiff on Myduty was again significant (coefficient .17, $p = .0187$) and was larger when we used an average of Israeli and Palestinian consequences (Mycons and Othercons) in place of the judgments of overall consequences (Overallcons; coefficient .36, $p = .0034$). Likewise, on regression of Myduty on Mycons and Othercons, the effect of Mycons was significant (coefficient of .32, $p = .0001$), but that of Othercons was not (coefficient −.02).

DISCUSSION

People's judgments of duty are more driven by national parochialism than are their judgments of overall consequences. They thus sometimes judge that they have a duty to support their nation even when doing so does not improve (and sometimes worsens) consequences on the whole, in their own judgment. Pure utilitarianism requires equal weighting of all people, but subjects here were free to give different weights to in-group and out-group members in their judgments of overall consequences, and they did so to some extent. Yet, their judgments of duty were even more responsive to in-group concerns.

Experiment 2 suggests that this sense of duty arises in part from a simple obligation to fellow citizens, a duty as citizens to support policies that benefit other citizens. Although subjects endorse a norm of reciprocity toward their nation (supporting it because of what it has done for them), this reason did not predict particular parochial judgments.

Deeper examination of the reasons for this sense of duty and its nature must await further research. For example, we do not know whether people think of it as purely moral or somehow implicit in the law, as a legal duty. Likewise, we do not know whether they see it as resulting from voluntary agreement, as in a (social) contract. And the obligation to give fellow citizens higher priority might stem from a variety of sources, such as emotional attachment, proximity, and similarity to others. (Galak, Kruger, & Rozin, 2008, explore the role of geographical boundaries.)

From a methodological point of view, the results provide another example of non-consequentialist judgments. One of the arguments made against purported demonstrations of non-consequentialist decisions is that the subjects actually think that their choices would bring about the best results (e.g., some commentaries on Baron, 1994). A simple counter-argument is to show that they themselves judge the consequences of their choices to be worse. This can sometimes be shown (e.g., Baron & Jurney, 1993), despite the fact that people often distort their judgments of consequences so as to favor their choices, as found here in Experiment 3.

From a philosophical perspective, we can ask whether people in fact have a duty to support their nation when doing so makes things worse on the whole. Of course, much has been written about this. (See Tan, 2004, for an entry into this extensive literature.) But we make a few comments here. First, many of the philosophical arguments for nationalism boil down to utilitarian ones, despite appearing not to do so. For example, arguments in terms of division of labor — with each group assigned the task of looking out for its own interests — are based on efficiency. It is just easier to do things this way. (And such an argument does not imply that we should hurt others knowingly, as Tan points out.) In general, utilitarian arguments of this sort should be part of "overall consequences." Indeed, subjects may think of such things when they judge that overall consequences are maximized if they attend to the interest of their nation. But our results indicate that people feel a duty that goes beyond such utilitarian consequences, as they perceive these.

We suspect that the sense of duty arises from an extension of the concept of familial obligation to a larger and more abstract group. Psychologically, such rules could be the result of indoctrination, without explicit attention to arguments on either side. Note that, although our results do not distinguish definitively among the various possible causes of parochialism, they do show that people accept their parochial tendencies as "ego-syntonic." They do not regard such nationalistic tendencies as primitive urges that ought to be suppressed. (Many people seem to think of racial prejudice this way.) The acceptance of parochialism as a duty is most consistent with the idea that it arises from social norms. But, as we noted, parochialism could also arise from any other cause in combination with post-hoc rationalization of the underlying impulse.

The sense of duty might also arise as part of the perceived moral obligation to defend one's own interests (Miller, 1999; Ratner & Miller, 2001), which then carries over to one's

[8]We used unstandardized regression coefficients for this analysis because the ranges tended to be smaller for the second regression, resulting in less variance accounted for. Note that the range of consequence judgments was from −2 to 2, whereas the range of duty judgments was from −1 to 1, so subjects with the strongest possible relationship, with all judgments at the extreme and perfectly correlated, would have a regression weight of .5.

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group (in the way described by Baron, 2001). By failing to endorse the best overall outcome, such a sense of duty can lead to harms against those who would benefit from such endorsement, and these harms are not justified by compensating benefits to others. Moreover, in most cases, it is not rational to defend one's narrow self-interest through political action, although it can be rational to vote for the best interests of all (Downs, 1957; Edlin, Gelman, & Kaplan, 2007).

We even found some direct evidence for a role of self-interest. In Experiments 1 and 2, Affect-you had an effect on the difference between Duty and Overall-cons, suggesting that the subjects felt a duty to defend their interest. In Experiment 2, many subjects endorsed self-interest as a reason for duty. This issue is further explored by Baron (2011).

From a practical point of view, we must admit that the results are somewhat disappointing. The original hope was to find that duty would express itself in voting but not so much in attitude surveys, opinion polls, or questions about what people "favor." Such a discrepancy would imply that opinion polls would often show that people were "ahead of their elected government" in favoring the greater good over narrow nationalism, and indeed, opinion polls of Israelis have occasionally showed such results, in which a majority opposed a nationalistic move by the government. Importantly, we found that the Favor responses were very close to Duty, however. People do not seem willing to go against their perceived duty in saying what they favor. If they were more willing, then governments might feel more comfortable in paying attention to polls, even when the polls oppose nationalistic policies. Again though, more research is needed on the extent to which people will trust governments that try to maximize overall consequences even when it means choosing options that are non-optimal from a national point of view.

One optimistic result is that subjects do not regard losses to the other side as benefits to their side. This means, at the very least, that they are potentially open to negotiation involving trade-offs or integrative negotiation, in which each side sacrifices what it cares less about in return for what it wants more, relative to the other side.

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APPENDIX A PROPOSALS USED IN EXPERIMENT 1

Repeal the free-trade agreement with Mexico (part of NAFTA).

Repeal the free-trade agreement with Canada (part of NAFTA).

Reduce by 50% the amount of U.S. oil exported to other countries.

Increase by 50% the number of guards on the U.S./Mexican border.

Require employers to ask for proof of citizenship or legal immigrant status.

Reduce the number of Chinese students allowed to enter Ph.D. programs in the U.S.

Reduce the U.S. contribution to United Nations peacekeeping by 50%.

Ratify the proposed free-trade agreement with Colombia.

Eliminate tariffs on all goods produced in Sub-Saharan African countries.

Eliminate quotas on sugar imports, allowing more foreign sugar to enter the U.S.

Eliminate tariffs on ethanol from Brazil (which is cheaper than that produced by U.S. farmers).

Allow illegal immigrants to apply for legal immigrant status after paying a $1000 fine.

Remove the subsidy for ethanol production from corn in order to increase the amount of corn available for food and food production.

Increase funds to fight malaria in Africa.

Increase funds to fight AIDS around the world.

Increase funding for research on agriculture in Asia and Africa, with the idea of increasing production.

Increase funding for research on tropical diseases.

Increase by 50% visas for technical workers who are sought by U.S. companies.

Reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the most efficient way by 25% of their current level. (This would involve higher taxes to discourage fossil fuels, investment in research and development, and regulation, which would raise other costs.)

Send troops to keep the peace in African countries where people are dying from local wars, such as Sudan and Congo.

APPENDIX B PROPOSALS USED IN EXPERIMENT 2

Repeal the free-trade agreement with Mexico (part of NAFTA).

Repeal the free-trade agreement with Canada (part of NAFTA).

Reject the proposed free-trade agreement with Colombia.

Reduce the number of Chinese students allowed to enter Ph.D. programs in the U.S.

Reduce the U.S. contribution to United Nations peacekeeping by 50%.

Reduce visas for technical workers who are sought by U. S. companies. // changed

Reduce U.S. contributions (now about $3.7 billion) to the World Bank (which provides financial and technical assistance to developing countries).

Eliminate tariffs on all goods produced in Sub-Saharan African countries.

Eliminate quotas on sugar imports, allowing more foreign sugar to enter the U.S.

Eliminate tariffs on ethanol from Brazil (which is cheaper than that produced by U.S. farmers).

Allow illegal immigrants to apply for legal immigrant status after paying a $1000 fine.

Remove the subsidy for ethanol production from corn in order to increase the amount of corn available for food and food production.

Increase funds to fight malaria in Africa.

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Increase funds to fight AIDS around the world.

Increase funding for research on agriculture in Asia and Africa, with the idea of increasing production.

Increase funding for research on tropical diseases.

Reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the most efficient way by 25% of their current level. (This would involve higher taxes to discourage fossil fuels, investment in research and development, and regulation, which would raise other costs.)

Contribute troops to peacekeeping forces in African countries where people are dying from local wars, such as Sudan and Congo.

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